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Cognitive Architecture of Belief Reasoning in Children and Adults: 
A Two-Systems Account Primer 
 
 
ABSTRACT—Characterizing the cognitive architecture of human mindreading forces 
us to address two puzzles in people’s attributions of belief: why children show 
inconsistent expectations about others’ belief-based actions, and why adults’ belief 
reasoning is sometimes automatic and sometimes not. The seemingly puzzling data 
suggest humans have multiple mindreading systems that use different models of the 
mental. The efficient system is shared by infants, children and adults, and uses a 
minimal model of mind, which enables belief-like states to be tracked. The flexible 
system is late-developing and uses a canonical model, which incorporates 
propositional attitudes. A given model’s operation has signature limits that produce 
performance contrasts, in children as well as adults, between certain types of 
mindreading tasks. 
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Our everyday mindreading ability helps us reason about how beliefs might influence 
people’s actions, inter-personal communications and conduct. There are difficult 
puzzles surrounding the nature of human beings’ belief attribution: (I) children show 
an apparently contradictory pattern of success and failure in their responses to 
scenarios involving others’ belief-based actions, and (II) belief reasoning is both non-
automatic and automatic. To solve these puzzles, we highlight evidence from 
cognitive studies of children and adults to survey an exciting approach to the 
architecture of mindreading suggesting that human beings can be in (at least) two 
minds about the ways in which others’ beliefs cause and rationalize behavior (1, 2). 
We discuss how ‘signature limits’ on low-level processes make it possible to 
differentiate between efficient versus flexible instances of mindreading. We then 
evaluate a contrasting account suggesting that human beings have a unitary and 
abstract psychological reasoning system from early in life.    
 
PUZZLES IN PEOPLE’S ATTRIBUTION OF BELIEF 
 
Puzzle I: Infants pass false-belief tasks but 3-year-olds fail? 
A measure of the development of our mindreading ability is the false-belief task. 
Wimmer and Perner (3) showed preschoolers a story where Maxi witnesses a target 
placed at location-X. In Maxi’s absence, the target is moved to location-Y. Children 
are asked to predict where Maxi would look for the target. Most 3-year-olds answered 
Maxi would look in Y, as if false-belief were impossible; by contrast, many 4-year-
olds answered X, indicating they recognized Maxi’s false-belief. The incorporation of 
belief into children’s understanding of minds from about age 4-years onwards is a 
well-replicated and robust experimental finding (4). Once children master verbal 
Systems, Models & Signature Limits                                                                                                      3  
false-belief tasks, they do so systematically and coherently for a large variety of topics 
and task formats. Importantly, 4-year-olds’ grasp of beliefs includes appreciating that 
beliefs are essentially aspectual; that is beliefs represent a given object under some 
guises but not others. Rakoczy, Bergfeld, Schwarz, and Fizke (5) found that when 4-
year-olds pass standard false-belief tasks, they begin to understand that an agent, 
depending on how he or she represents something, can mistakenly believe that there 
are two objects present when, in fact, there is only one.  
The findings from explicit verbal tasks contrast with results from non-verbal 
measures. Whereas 3-year-olds’ verbal predictions indicate that they reason as if 
false-belief were impossible, their gaze anticipations to the same situation indicate 
that they can track others’ false-beliefs (6, 7, 8). The dissociation is supported by 
violation-of-expectation studies contrasting looking-times to scenarios that are either 
consistent or inconsistent with an agent’s belief. Onishi and Baillargeon (9) showed 
15-month-olds scenarios of an agent forming either a true- or false-belief about an 
object’s location. The agent searched in the belief-compatible or the belief-
incompatible location. Infants looked longer when the agent searched in the belief-
incompatible location. Longer looking is interpreted as infants expecting agents to act 
according to their beliefs. Other studies suggest that 7- to 18-month-olds can track 
false-beliefs about contents and types of objects, and tailor their helping and 
communication to others’ false-belief about object-location (10). The first puzzle is 
thus: How can infants and toddlers display sensitivity to others’ false-beliefs when 
responding in some ways while they treat false-belief as impossible when responding 
to the very same situation in other ways? 
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Puzzle II: Belief reasoning is both non-automatic and automatic 
Studies of adult humans also point to seemingly incompatible sets of findings 
regarding the automaticity of mindreading inferences. A mindreading process is 
automatic if its occurrence is to a significant degree independent of its relevance to 
participants’ tasks and motives. Apperly and colleagues (11) found that false-beliefs 
are not ascribed automatically: adults with no specific motivation to attend to a 
character’s beliefs were slower to respond to unpredictable probe questions about an 
agent’s false-belief of an object’s whereabouts than to matched control probes. The 
case for non-automaticity is also supported by research showing that belief tracking 
frequently depends on attention and working memory resources in fully competent 
adults and, further, that even merely holding in mind someone else’s belief incurs 
significant processing costs (12). 
      However, there is also a body of evidence pointing to a different conclusion. 
Schneider, Nott, and Dux (13) found that a character’s false-belief can influence 
adults’ visual attention irrespective of the relevance of the belief to the tasks adults 
were assigned. Both adults who were told to track a character’s belief and adults who 
were told to track a ball’s location fixated longer at an empty box before the character 
returned to the scene and falsely believed the box to contain the ball than when the 
character believed it was empty. Mirroring findings from young children, Van der 
Wel and colleagues (14) found that the effects of indirect belief calculation were 
different from the effects of direct belief judgments. Adults saw a ball and a cube 
disappear behind two screens. A bystander had a false-belief whilst participants had a 
true-belief about the objects’ locations. Participants who were instructed to move a 
computer mouse to reach the ball’s location showed involuntary tracking of belief: 
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their mouse movements to the ball were skewed towards where the bystander falsely-
believed the ball to be. Deliberate inferences showed different effects: participants 
who were told to track beliefs took longer to move the mouse when their beliefs 
differed from the bystander’s (and their mouse movements were not skewed by the 
bystander’s beliefs). The second puzzle is thus: How can belief tracking be sometimes 
but not always automatic?    
 
TWO-SYSTEMS ACCOUNT 
 
We can solve the puzzles by supposing that mindreading architecture involves at least 
two systems for tracking mental states, with complementary trade-offs between 
efficiency and flexibility in much the sense that, on some theories, there are at least 
two systems for tracking number (15). The efficient mindreading system is 
evolutionarily and ontogenetically ancient, fast-operating, largely automatic and 
independent of central cognitive resources. In contrast, the flexible mindreading 
system is late-developing, slow-operating, making deep and lasting demands on 
executive control processes. Advances in executive function and language help 
cultivate flexible attributions about others’ psychological perspectives (12). While the 
efficient system typically subserves responses that occur independently of a subject’s 
task and motives (e.g., looking-behavior on some tasks), the flexible system is 
recruited by tasks that require declarative expressions of and/or deliberation about 
beliefs.   
The processes that drive the efficient system may be trigged by direct cues like 
an agent’s line of sight so that that rapid online mindreading may be supported in 
subjects with limited information-processing resources. Deployment of the flexible 
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system is not dependent upon the immediate availability of cues about what a target 
witnesses. Components of efficient mindreading may have non-zero cognitive costs 
and may place some demands on working memory, as indicated by findings 
suggesting that dual tasking may disrupt looking-time responses to false-belief tasks 
(16). The efficient system should remain relatively distinct from the more flexible 
system, although there might be some exchange of information between systems over 
the course of development (7, 12, 17).   
Efficient mindreading is distinct from flexible mindreading in terms of 
signature limits arising from the type of model of the mental that the respective 
systems rely on. The flexible system uses a canonical model of the mental where 
belief is characterized as a propositional attitude. A propositional attitude is a state 
whose content can be picked out with a that-clause (e.g., Lucy believes that the 
Morning Star is above the horizon). A canonical model takes into account the 
aspectuality of beliefs, so that although the Morning Star is the Evening Star, Lucy’s 
belief that the Morning Star is above the horizon is distinct from her belief that the 
Evening Star is at that location. Such flexible reasoning would support understanding 
of mistakes in others’ representations of identity in the numerical sense, as when Lucy 
falsely believes the Morning Star is not the Evening Star. The efficient system, by 
contrast, uses a minimal model of the mental where psychological states including 
belief-like states are characterized as relational attitudes – states whose contents can 
be distinguished using relations between objects and locations or other properties.  
Belief-like states can serve as proxies for beliefs: in a limited but useful range 
of situations, ascriptions of beliefs and belief-like states lead to identical expectations 
about an agent’s behaviour. However, their contents are not as fine-grained as the 
truth conditions of beliefs proper; crucially, they are not aspectual, i.e. do not 
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distinguish under which guises objects and situations are represented (2). If Lucy has 
a belief-like relational attitude to the Morning Star and its position above the horizon, 
and if the Morning Star is the Evening Star, then she has the same attitude concerning 
the Evening Star. An efficient mindreading system will therefore display a signature 
limit concerning the aspectuality of belief.  
Much like ascribing belief, there is also more to reasoning about perception 
than tracking someone’s visual connection to an object; different visual experiences 
may represent the very same thing in different ways. An efficient mindreading system 
that is set to track relational attitudes will also be ill-equipped to process the aspectual 
nature of mental states generally. The 2-systems account therefore predicts that the 
efficient system can cover Level-I visual-perspective-taking tasks (tracking what is or 
is not perceptible from different perspectives) and simple false-belief tasks about the 
location of objects (the subject has to keep track of what the agent has or has not 
witnessed). However, this system cannot cover Level-II visual-perspective-taking 
(representing the particular way someone sees an object) or ascribing false-beliefs 
about numerical identity, giving rise to signature limits. 
 
SIGNATURE LIMITS ON EFFICIENT MINDREADING 
 
There are at least three sources of relevant evidence. First, visual perspective-taking 
studies show that humans automatically track what is seen but not how something is 
seen. Samson and colleagues (18) showed adults photographs where an avatar saw all 
of the dots on a wall (his perspective was consistent with participants’) or where the 
avatar saw a subset of the dots (his perspective was inconsistent with participants’). 
Adults were slower and more error-prone in judging how many dots they could see 
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when the avatar happened to have a different perspective. Furlanetto and colleagues 
(19) confirmed that adults experienced interference from the avatar’s perspective only 
if they believed he could see, suggesting that interference resulted from processing of 
the avatar’s mental states, and not merely the direction in which he was facing (cf. 
20). Thus, even when calculating what others see (a Level-I perspective-taking 
scenario) is task-irrelevant, children and adults automatically track others’ 
encountering and registration of objects, and this causes interference on self-
judgments.  
     Fitting with the 2-systems account, the interference in Level-I perspective-taking 
scenarios does not generalize to Level-II perspective-taking scenarios, which concern 
how an agent represents an object. Surtees and colleagues (21, 22) found that children 
and adults did not automatically show such interference effects when participants had 
to report how they represented a rotationally asymmetrical digit (e.g., a ‘6’) that was 
perceived differently from the avatar’s opposite viewing angle (e.g., as a ‘9’). Similar 
patterns have been found in experiments measuring adults’ eye movements during 
real-time discourse processing. For example, Mozuraitis, Chambers and Daneman 
(23) found that listeners distinguished between what they know versus what a speaker 
is inferred to know based on whether an object was seen, but not how it was seen. 
Second, Low and Watts (24) found that 3- and 4-year-olds and adults 
displayed accurate looking-time responses with the usual age-related improvements in 
verbal predictions when construing an agent’s false-belief about object-location. 
However, the same participants showed incorrect looking when tracking how an 
agent’s representation of identities would lead to a false-belief that there were two 
objects when, in fact, there was only one object (Figure 1, Column 1). The switch 
from a location to an identity task did not affect declarative responding; 4-year-olds 
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and a majority of the adults provided accurate verbal predictions. However, 
participants experienced the different visual aspects of the deceptive object late in the 
sequence. Demands associated with revising and updating inferences about the 
agent’s representation of identities might have impaired participants’ looking 
responses. That said, Wang, Hadi and Low (25) found that adults still showed 
incorrect gaze anticipations (but correct verbal predictions) when the test object 
revealed its dual aspect early in the sequence (Figure 1, Column 2). 
***Figure-1*** 
Third, Fizke, Butterfill and Rakoczy (26) uncovered complementary findings 
when measuring toddlers’ helping behavior. An object that was both an [A] and a [B] 
(e.g., reversible rabbit-carrot toy) was put into box-1 in the agent’s presence as [A]. 
The object was then turned into its B-aspect and returned to box-1 – in the absence of 
the agent in the false-belief condition (so that she was unaware of the identity A=B), 
but witnessed by the agent in the true-belief condition. Then the agent observed the 
object (as [B]) moved from box-1 to box-2. The agent struggled to open box-1 and 
children’s spontaneous helping was recorded. Children did not behave differently 
between the false- and true-belief conditions: the majority of toddlers focused on 
goal-directed relations and opened box-1. It is not that toddlers failed to understand 
identity per se; 14-month-olds can disregard superficial features and sort by object 
identity (27). Crucially, when the false-belief task was switched to pure location 
tracking (cf. 28), children did differentiate true- and false-belief conditions, mostly 
opening box-2 in the latter and box-1 in the former.  
In summary, there is converging evidence showing that the efficient 
mindreading system breaks down in cases involving Level-II perspective-taking and 
beliefs about numerical identity. Because such cases require reasoning based on a 
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canonical model of the mental, we can use such limits to identify whether an 
individual’s performance on a particular task involves the efficient or flexible 
mindreading systems (1, 2). 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE: EARLY-MINDREADING ACCOUNT 
 
The two-systems account contrasts with the approach suggesting that humans have a 
unitary early-developing (possibly innate) psychological reasoning system that parses 
mental states from behavior. According to the early-mindreading account, infants and 
young children succeed in violation-of-expectation or anticipatory-looking tasks 
because those tasks only involve the belief representation process (10). Additional 
processes are involved in tasks that typically require making verbal responses to a 
question; 3-year-olds also need to select between different possible responses to the 
test question, and inhibit a default to answer from their own knowledge. The 
additional processes overwhelm 3-year-olds’ limited executive functioning, masking 
innate belief-reasoning competence.  
     Following the early-mindreading account, some experiments suggest that 17- to 
18-month-olds can already attribute false-beliefs about identity (29, 30). However, 
these experiments could just as well suggest that infants are tracking beliefs about the 
types of objects present rather than about numerical identity (2). That said, Scott and 
colleagues (31) provided other evidence suggesting that infants’ mindreading may be 
relatively sophisticated. Specifically, 17-month-olds watched a thief attempt to steal a 
preferred object (a rattling toy) when its owner was momentarily absent by 
substituting it with a less-preferred object (a non-rattling toy). Infants looked longer 
when the thief substituted the preferred object with a non-visually-matching silent toy 
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compared to when the thief substituted it with a visually-matching silent toy. The 
authors postulated that infants can ascribe to the thief an intention to implant in the 
owner a false-belief about the identity of the substituted toy. The authors further 
suggested that infants make such ascriptions only when the substitution involves a 
visually-matching toy and the owner will not test whether the toy rattles on her return.  
     However, Scott et al.’s (31) explanations also require postulating that infants take 
the thief to be strikingly inept; despite having the opportunity simply to pilfer from a 
closed box known to contain at least three rattling toys, the thief engages in elaborate 
deception which will be uncovered whenever the substituted toy is next shaken and 
the thief, as sole suspect, easily identified. A further difficulty is that factors unrelated 
to the thief’s mental states vary between conditions, such as the frequencies with 
which toys visually matching one present during the final phase of the test trial have 
rattled. These considerations jointly indicate that further evidence would be needed to 
support the claim that humans’ early mindreading capacity enables them to ascribe 
intentions concerning false-beliefs involving numerical identity. 
In support of the early-mindreading account, Carruthers (32) suggests that 
performance issues can also explain findings showing non-automatic belief 
attribution. With respect to Apperly et al.’s (11) study, Carruthers worries about the 
interval between the belief cues and belief questions being longer than the interval 
between the reality cues and reality questions. Adults might be slower at attributing 
beliefs because they had to retrieve information about the agent’s beliefs (which had 
been automatically inferred) from long-term memory when responding to 
unpredictable probe questions. Carruthers spotlights Cohen and German’s (33) study 
arguing that adults automatically inferred beliefs when there was a shorter interval 
between belief cues and questions. However, in Cohen and German’s study, the 
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context of the agent putting a marker on the wrong container just before the belief 
probe could just as well prompt adults to spontaneously (rather than automatically) 
infer the agent’s false-belief as a relevant explanation for her mistaken endorsement. 
Indeed, Back and Apperly (34) found that task context motivated adults to make 
spontaneous inferences about an agent’s beliefs, and could maintain them over time, 
even though they did not need to. In the absence of such motivation, however, 
participants did not automatically make belief inferences even when the stimulus 
afforded such inferences. 
The broader developmental evidence is also not entirely consistent with the 
explanation that contradictions in responses to false-belief scenarios reflect 
completely incidental demands on executive processing. Cultural differences in 
inhibitory control are not linked to corresponding differences in performance on 
standard false-belief tasks (35). Three-year-olds do not even find selection-less false-
belief tasks easier than standard false-belief tasks (36). As Wellman (36) notes, it is 
also unclear why certain indirect tasks (e.g., violation-of-expectation paradigm) are 
assumed to be free of inhibition demands when infants apparently face the same 
problem of controlling a default reading of the situation in terms of where the object 
really is located to track beliefs instead. The notion of underlying belief-reasoning 
competence being masked by incidental task demands to inhibit a tendency to answer 
from one’s own knowledge would also need stretching to account for interference 
effects on reality judgments. Studies show that adults and children find it difficult to 
even hold others’ false-beliefs in mind, resulting in slower and incorrect judgments 
about reality (37, 38). These considerations suggest that constraints on information-
processing play a deeper and more nuanced developmental role in the construction, 
maintenance and use of belief concepts, in addition to lasting roles in the mature 
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mindreading system (12). The two-systems account fits better with the diverse 
literatures where mindreading is studied.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The two-systems approach to mindreading is theoretically motivated and we are 
starting to see its predictions tested and confirmed. The view is committed to an 
efficient system present in infants having representational powers limited by the 
(minimal) model of the mental it relies on. There is accumulating evidence—
involving different ages, populations and paradigms—showing that an efficient 
system tracking belief-like states can handle some visual-perspective and false-belief 
problems, but not others. Research is needed to map the terrain of the efficient (versus 
flexible) mindreading system, whether it is limited to handling certain kinds of agents, 
desire-like states, trait impressions, and perspective-based utterances of low 
complexity (1, 39, 40). Studying the temporal course of behavioral and neural activity 
associated with tracking belief-like states versus ascribing belief in real-time settings 
will also illuminate circumstances where information might pass between systems, 
and delineate precise moments in time when mindreading inferences are constructed, 
stored and used. New thinking about the cognitive architecture of human mindreading 
as involving multiple systems, models and signature limits may be necessary for 
making sense of dissociations both between different response classes and also 
between non-automatic and automatic processing. 
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Figure 1. In Low and Watts’ (2013) identity task (Column 1), the robot’s red and blue 
aspects are revealed after it moved from the right-side box-A to the left-side box-B 
(Frame 1.2). Inside box-B, visible only to participants, the robot spun around to reveal 
its red and blue sides. Then the robot, with its blue aspect facing participants, moved 
back to box-A. If viewers represent object identities, they should anticipate that the 
agent falsely believes that there is another (blue) robot inside box-B. The agent 
(having a blue-color preference, for example) would have reason to reach into box-B. 
If participants tracked object registrations, then the robot is inside box-A and the 
agent should search there. In Wang, Hadi and Low’s (2015) modified version 
(Column 2), dual identity was revealed inside box-A before the robot’s first 
movement (Frame 2.1). In both versions, participants showed incorrect looking 
responses (to box-A) with age-related increases in accuracy of verbal predictions. 
